

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 165128

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NATO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FROM WASHINGTON  
THE FOLLOWING IS A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATE  
DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
THE SOVIET LEADERS VIEWS ON CHINA

1. BEGIN SUMMARY PERHAPS THE MOST UNIFYING SINGLE FACTOR  
IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP POLITICS IS CONCERN OVER CHINA.  
CHINA CONSTITUTES NOT ONLY A "THREAT" TO SOVIET HEGEMONY  
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT BUT ALSO, AS  
DEMONSTRATED BY THE DAMANSKIY ISLAND CLASHES IN 1969 AND  
THE BUILDUP OF CHINESE MISSILE CAPABILITIES, A PHYSICAL  
"THREAT."

2. WHILE UNITED ON THE NEED TO DEFEND SOVIET INTERESTS  
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PAGE 02 STATE 165128

BY REDUCING, IF NOT ELIMINATING, REAL OR POTENTIAL CHINESE  
CHALLENGES, THE SOVIET LEADERS EVIDENTLY ARE FAR FROM  
CERTAIN OR UNITED ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.  
JUDGING FROM THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS SINCE 1969, THERE

APPEARS TO BE A CONTINUING CONSENSUS FAVORING MODEST

CONCILIATION ALONG STATE-TO-STATE LINES AS THE BEST HOPE FOR DEFUSING THE DANGER; A SIGNIFICANT MINORITY, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY STILL BELIEVES THAT A HARD-LINE STANCE IS THE ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH THE CHINESE.

3. A COMPARISON OF GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV'S STATEMENTS SINCE 1969 ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THOSE OF 11 OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO HAVE SPOKEN OUT ON THE SUBJECT SUGGESTS BREZHNEV'S ROLE AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE CONSENSUS ON THIS ISSUE, BUT REVEALS SOME INTRIGUING DIFFERENCES IN TONE AND EMPHASIS ON THE PART OF OTHERS, IMPLYING DIFFERENT VIEWS ON HOW TO SOLVE THE CHINA DILEMMA. NOT SURPRISINGLY, PREMIER KOSYGIN STANDS OUT FOR HIS CONCILIATORY APPROACH, WHILE CHIEF PARTY IDEOLOGUE SUSLOV, DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO, AND RECENTLY OUSTED POLITBURO MEMBER SHELEPIN, IN CONTRAST, TAKE ANTAGONISTIC STANCES. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SOME SURPRISES IN THE APPARENT ATTITUDES OF THE REST OF THE POLITBURO; FOR EXAMPLE, GROMYKO IS AMONG THOSE ESPOUSING THE HARDER LINE, MAZUROV APPEARS TO BE STRONGLY CONCILIATORY, AND ANDROPOV COMES OUT A MODERATE.

4. RELATIVELY SPEAKING, BREZHNEV'S STATEMENTS ARE EMINENTLY EVENHANDED. COMPARED WITH THOSE OF HIS COLLEAGUES, HE APPEARS TO BE VERY DELIBERATELY MAINTAINING A MODERATE POSITION IN PUBLIC--CRITICIZING THE CHINESE, BUT HOLDING OUT PROSPECTS FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. SINCE BREZHNEV IS REPORTED TO BE EMOTIONALLY ANTI-CHINESE PERSONALLY, HIS PUBLIC MODERATION IS ALL THE MORE INTERESTING, SUGGESTING THAT HE HEWS CAREFULLY TO THE POLITBURO CONSENSUS RATHER THAN TO PERSONAL VIEWS WHEN SPEAKING ON THIS SUBJECT.

5. OVERALL, KOSYGIN AND, LESS CLEARLY, MAZUROV APPEAR TO BE THE POLITBURO'S CHINA "DOVES." BOTH ARE FIRMLY POSITIONED FOR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 STATE 165128

TIVE SUPPORTERS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, AND KOSYGIN IS THE MILDEST OF THE POLITBURO IN REFERRING TO SOVIET GRIEVANCES WITH CHINA. WHILE THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON CHINA HAVE BEEN FEW, KGB CHIEF ANDROPOV AND MOSCOW PARTY BOSS GRISHIN APPEAR TO FALL AMONG THE MODERATES AS WELL.

6- BREZHNEV'S DEPUTY AND HEIR-APPARENT, KIRILENKO, LIKE BREZHNEV, TENDS TO STAND ASTRIDE THE MODERATE POSITION. HE HAS BEEN AN ADVOCATE OF NORMALIZATION AND RESTRAINED IN CITING GRIEVANCES. HE HAS BEEN THE MOST EVENHANDED, MORE SO THAN BREZHNEV OR KOSYGIN, IN REFRAINING FROM USE OF POLITICALLY LOADED LABELS FOR DESCRIBING THE CHINESE

LEADERSHIP.

7. ON THE HAWKISH SIDE STAND PODGORNYY AND PELSHE AND, IN MORE EXTREME POSITIONS, SUSLOV, GROMYKO, AND GRECHKO. FORMER POLITBURO MEMBER SHELEPIN HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN THE MOST EXTREME, APPARENTLY UNCOMPROMISINGLY ANTAGONISTIC TOWARD THE CHINESE.

8. EXACTLY WHERE FOUR OTHER LEADERS STAND CAN ONLY BE SPECULATED; THEY HAVE GENERALLY AVOIDED COMMENT ON CHINA IN PUBLIC. THREE OF THEM, KULAKOV, KUNAYEV, AND SHCHERBITSKIY, AS BREZHNEV PROTEGES MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW HIS LEAD. POLYANSKIY, GENERALLY RECKONED AS A CONSERVATIVE, PRESUMABLY SHOULD BE CLOSE TO PODGORNYY'S VIEW AT LEAST.

9. IF BREZHNEV'S PUBLIC LINE DOES REPRESENT A DISTILLATION OR COMPROMISE OF DIFFERING POLITBURO VIEWS, AND IF INDIVIDUAL VIEWPOINTS VARY AS MUCH AS THEY SEEM TO, THE ISSUE OF CHINA MAY WELL BE ONE OF THE MOST CONTENTIOUS AND DIVISIVE IN KREMLIN DEBATES. HOW IT MAY FIGURE IN THE MANEUVERING FOR POSITION IS UNKNOWN; IT CAN ONLY BE NOTED THAT THE VICTIMS OF THE LAST TWO MAJOR OUSTERS FROM THE POLITBURO--SHELEST AND SHELEPIN--HAD BEEN LESS INHIBITED THAN THE OTHERS IN PUBLICLY VOICING STRONGLY ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENTS.

10. ADMITTEDLY, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY POLITICAL LEADERS MAY REFLECT INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS OR TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
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PAGE 04 STATE 165128

RATHER THAN PERSONAL ATTITUDES. THE POSITION OF GRECHKO ON THE HAWKISH END OF THE SPECTRUM WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH HIS DEFENSE ROLE. SIMILARLY, KOSYGIN'S CONCILIATORY STANCE MAY BE A FUNCTION OF SOVIET POLICY DIRECTED TOWARD IMPROVED STATE RELATIONS. NOR IS IT SURPRISING THAT IDEOLOGUE SUSLOV TAKES A CONSERVATIVE POSITION IN DEALING WITH PEKING'S "HERESIES."

11. BUT NOT ALL SOVIET LEADERS' VIEWS REPRESENT CLEARLY DEFINABLE INSTITUTIONAL OUTLOOKS. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PODGORNYY AND GROMYKO, FOR INSTANCE, SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY PUSH THEM TOWARD A HAWKISH POSITION. THEIR PUBLIC ATTITUDES, AND THOSE OF OTHERS, MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN SHAPED BY PERSONAL OR CULTURAL ATTITUDES, AND COULD REFLECT TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND POLITICAL MANEUVERING.

12. IN ANY EVENT, GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE THE SOVIETS ATTACH TO THE CHINESE QUESTION AND THE EVIDENT DIVERSITY OF VIEWS WITHIN THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP ON HOW BEST TO COPE WITH CHINA, IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF POLICY TOWARD CHINA

IS ONE OF THE FIRST ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED BY A POST-BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP. THIS WAS THE CASE FOLLOWING THE

OUSTER OF KHRUSHCHEV AND, THOUGH SOVIET EXPECTATIONS OF IMPROVEMENT WERE DISAPPOINTED THEN, SOME SIMILAR SOVIET INITIATIVES TO EASE THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP APPEAR LIKELY. ADDITIONALLY, SHOULD THE CHINESE SUCCESSION BEGIN BEFORE THAT OF THE SOVIETS, EVEN THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP CAN BE EXPECTED TO RENEW ITS ATTEMPTS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH PEKING. END SUMMARY

THE ISSUES

13. SINCE 1969, SOVIET PARTY LEADER BREZHNEV HAS COMMENTED ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN AT LEAST 13 PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HIS SPEECH AT THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS ON MARCH 30, 1971, LAID OUT A TWO-PRONGED POLICY WHICH REMAINS IN FORCE TODAY: SHARP CRITICISM AND FIRM REJECTION OF PEKING'S "HOSTILE," "ANTI-LENINIST POLICY," COUPLED WITH ACTIVE EFFORTS FOR "NORMALIZATION" OF RELATIONS AND SETTLEMENT OF GRIEVANCES. THE LINE AS EXPOUNDED BY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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PAGE 05 STATE 165128

BREZHNEV HAS REMAINED REMARKEDLY UNIFORM OVER THE INTERVENING YEARS, ALTHOUGH THE ADVENT OF DETENTE HAS INEVITABLY ADDED THIS NEW ISSUE TO THE QUARREL.

14. AN EXAMINATION OF BREZHNEV'S STATEMENTS SHOW THAT, AS OF 1969, THE BASIC SOVIET CHARGES AGAINST THE CHINESE HAD BEEN:

(A)--SPLITTING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT;

(B)--DAMAGING THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE; AND

(C)--ATTACKING IDEOLOGICALLY AND POLITICALLY THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND PARTY.

SUBSEQUENT TO 1969, BREZHNEV LEVELED ADDITIONAL ACCUSATIONS:

(A)--KINDLING WAR PSYCHOSIS (1970);

(B)--ADVANCING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS (1971);

(C)--FORMENTING ARMED INCIDENTS (1971);

(D)--INVENTING A SOVIET "THREAT" (1972);

(E)--SABOTAGING ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS (1972);

(F)--ALIGNING (1972) AND TEAMING UP WITH REACTION (1973);

(G)--DAMAGING EFFORTS AT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1973);  
AND

(H)--OPPOSING AND ATTEMPTING TO WRECK DETENTE (1974).

#### MEASURING THE DIFFERENCES

15. CALLING THE CHINESE NAMES: ONE INTRIGUING INDICATION IN A COMPARISON OF THE SOVIET LEADERS' STATEMENTS ON CHINA IS THEIR VERY DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENT OF BOTH STRAIGHTFORWARD AND POLITICALLY LOADED LABELS FOR THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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PAGE 06 STATE 165128

CHINESE LEADERSHIP. "MAOIST" IN THE SOVIET LEXICON, FOR EXAMPLE, IS A FLATLY NEGATIVE TERM, WHILE "CHINESE LEADERS" OR "CHINESE SIDE" SEEMS TO REFLECT A CONSCIOUS EFFORT AT EVENHANDEDNESS OR AT LEAST DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE "ENEMY" AND THE REST OF CHINA.

16. THIRTEEN OF THE POLITBURO MEMBERS HAVE USED SOME OF THE PEJORATIVE LABELS IN REFERENCE TO THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, AS WELL AS LESS LOADED ONES. PODGORNYY, MAZUROV, AND SHELEPIN HAVE USED BOTH SETS OF LABELS ABOUT EVENLY. KOSYGIN, KIRILENKO, AND GROMYKO LEAN STRONGLY TO THE NONPOLEMICAL SIDE. SUSLOV HAS USED NOTHING BUT HIGHLY UNFAVORABLE LABELS FOR THE CHINESE. FORMER POLITBURO MEMBER SHELEST SEEMS TO HAVE WON POST-KHRUSHCHEVIAN HONORS FOR CHINA POLEMICS. IN 1969, HE CALLED THE CHINESE "TRAITORS," "WRETCHED ADVENTURERS," AND ENEMIES OF THE SOVIET (AND CHINESE) PEOPLE, MORE LOADED LANGUAGE THAN ANYONE USED BEFORE OR AFTERWARD. (SECTION 1 IN THE ANNEX SHOWS THREE BROAD GROUPINGS OF THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERS WITH REGARD TO "NAMECALLING.")

17. ACCUSATIONS: AMONG THE DOZEN GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE CHINESE ECHOED BY THE SOVIET LEADERS, SEVERAL STAND OUT BECAUSE OF SUBTLE DIFFERENCES IN EMPHASIS GIVEN THEM BY INDIVIDUAL LEADERS. WHILE ALL TEND TO AGREE ON THE CHINESE "ANTI-SOVIETISM" AND PEKING'S THREAT TO WORLD SOCIALISM AND THE "ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE," THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERING REACTIONS TO THE CHINESE CLAIM OF A SOVIET "THREAT FROM THE NORTH."

18. SHELEPIN DEALT WITH THE "THREAT" FIRST, IN 1970, WELL BEFORE BREZHNEV CALLED IT AN "INVENTION" IN 1972. KIRILENKO DISMISSED IT AS "IMAGINARY" AND MAZUROV AS "FABRICATED" IN 1973. KOSYGIN, IN SOME SEVEN SPEECHES SINCE 1970, HAS NEVER ONCE ALLUDED TO THE "NORTHERN

THREAT" CHARGE. IN 1974, PODGORNYY AND GRECHKO BOTH  
ACCUSED THE CHINESE OF USING THE ISSUE AS A PRETEXT FOR

BUILDING UP A "NUCLEAR MISSILE POTENTIAL"; GRECHKO THEN  
LINKED THE CHINESE "HOSTILE ATTITUDE" WITH THE NEED FOR  
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PAGE 07 STATE 165128

VIGILANCE AND A STRONG DEFENSE.

19. IN 1969 AND 1970, PODGORNYY, SUSLOV, AND GROMYKO RE-  
ACTED TO A CHINESE CLAIM THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ENEMY  
NUMBER ONE." ONLY SUSLOV LATER REPEATED THIS POINT,  
IN 1973.

20. BEGINNING IN 1972 WITH BREZHNEV, NINE SOVIET LEADERS  
(BUT NOT ANDROPOV, GRISHIN, OR GRECHKO) ACCUSED THE  
CHINESE OF OPPOSING DETENTE, IN STATEMENTS RANGING FROM  
PODGORNYY'S INDICTMENT OF THEM FOR "FIERCE OBSTRUCTION"  
(1973) TO SUSLOV'S GRAPHIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE  
CHINESE AS "WIELDING A BLADE AGAINST DETENTE" (1974).

21. THE GRIEVANCE MOST WIDELY CITED IS THAT OF ALLEGED  
CHINESE TIES TO IMPERIALISM. ELEVEN LEADERS HAVE  
SPECIFICALLY LINKED THE CHINESE TO IMPERIALIST BLOCS OR  
FORCES (BREZHNEV, HOWEVER, LIMITED HIMSELF TO FINDING  
TIES ONLY WITH "REACTION"). THE VIEWS RANGE FROM  
SUSLOV'S EXTREME CLAIM THAT THE CHINESE HAVE "ACTUALLY  
JOINED" THE IMPERIALISTS (1973), AND SHELEPIN'S POR-  
TRAYAL OF THEM THAT YEAR AS THE "DIRECT ACCOMPLICE" OF  
IMPERIALISM, TO KOSYGIN'S MUCH MORE MODULATED FINDING  
THAT THE CHINESE "WERE ALIGNING THEMSELVES WITH THE  
IMPERIALISTS" (1974).

22. ON A RELATED ISSUE, THAT OF ALLEGED CHINESE URGING  
OF REACTIONARY FORCES "INTO A HARD-LINE POSITION"  
(SUSLOV, 1974), SHELEPIN AGAIN TOOK AN EXTREME POSITION  
CHARGING THE CHINESE WITH FIGHTING "FOR THE PRESENCE OF  
US TROOPS IN EUROPE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA" (1973). THAT  
SAME YEAR BREZHNEV USED A Milder FORMULATION, I.E., THAT  
THE CHINESE WERE "ACTIVATING" THE CAPITALIST AGGRESSIVE  
BLOC. KIRILENKO, IN 1974, SIMILARLY CHARGED THE CHINESE  
WITH CALLING FOR "CONSOLIDATION OF IMPERIALIST MILITARY  
BLOCS AND A BUILDUP OF THE ARMS RACE." SOVIET LEADERSHIP  
STATEMENTS ON THE CHINESE TIE TO IMPERIALISM AGAIN APPEAR  
TO RANGE THEM GENERALLY IN THREE GROUPINGS, WITH BREZHNEV  
THE MOST MODERATE (SEE SECTION 2 IN ANNEX ).

NORMALIZATION, A KEY FACTOR  
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PAGE 08 STATE 165128

23. AN IMPORTANT KEY TO THE SOVIET LEADERS' INDIVIDUAL POSITIONS ON CHINA POLICY WOULD SEEM TO LIE IN THEIR AFFIRMATION OF SUPPORT--EITHER ACTIVE OR PASSIVE--FOR NORMALIZING RELATIONS. IT IS CLEARLY BREZHNEV WHO HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN INSISTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL

"DO EVERYTHING" TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH CHINA (1970). AT THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS, BREZHNEV REITERATED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO "ACT FURTHER" TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS, AND HE HAS REPEATED THIS THEME ALMOST EVERY YEAR. IN HIS NOVEMBER 1974 ULAN BATOR SPEECH, HE EVEN BROADENED HIS POSITION SOMEWHAT:

24. "THE SOVIET UNION CONSTANTLY STRIVES FOR SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS TO ENTER A NORMAL CHANNEL.... WE ARE READY TO RESTORE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE CHINESE PEOPLE.... WE DO NOT ADVANCE ANY PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION.... WE CONTINUE HOPING THAT COMMON SENSE AND CONSIDERATION OF VITAL INTERESTS... WILL PREVAIL...."

25. BOTH KOSYGIN AND KIRILENKO IN 1974 ENDORSED BREZHNEV'S MORE ACTIVIST LINE FOR NORMALIZATION; EARLIER THEY HAD EXPRESSED ONLY "SUPPORT" FOR NORMALIZATION. MAZUROV APPEARS TO HAVE FOLLOWED BREZHNEV'S LEAD HERE FROM AS EARLY AS 1972. GROMYKO ESPOUSED ACTIVE SUPPORT ONLY IN HIS 1974 OCTOBER REVOLUTION DAY SPEECH AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE LEADERSHIP. HIS EARLIER, PASSIVE SUPPORT POSITION MAY WELL REFLECT A MORE PERSONAL VIEW.

26. PODGORNYY AND SUSLOV ARE NOTABLE FOR THEIR HEDGING ON NORMALIZATION; GRECHKO AND SHELEPIN HAVE AVOIDED MENTIONING IT. GRECHKO INSTEAD EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE WOULD "FIND WITHIN THEMSELVES THE STRENGTH" TO RESTORE RELATIONS TO AN EVEN KEEL (1974). AS EARLY AS 1970, SHELEPIN WAS CONSISTENTLY STRESSING THE CAVEATS AND NOT THE DESIRABILITY OF IMPROVEMENT. IN 1974, HE REFRAINED FROM ANY COMMENTS AT ALL ON IMPROVEMENT. SOVIET STATEMENTS SHOW THAT 10 LEADERS (NOT GRECHKO OR SHELEPIN) HAVE FAVORED NORMALIZATION (SEE SECTION 3).  
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PAGE 09 STATE 165128

PROPOSERS OF THE REBUFF

27. WHILE ADVOCATING IMPROVED RELATIONS, MANY OF THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE EMPLOYED TOUGH TO MODERATE LANGUAGE IN CHARACTERIZING SOVIET REACTION TO OFFENSIVE CHINESE BEHAVIOR. THE INDIVIDUAL SHADINGS RANGE FROM CALLS FOR "REBUFF" TO COUNSELS FOR "RESTRAINT." BREZHNEV HAS USED

BOTH FORMULAS, AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHERS WHICH LIE BETWEEN THESE TWO EXTREMES. MAZUROV'S POSITION APPEARS CLOSEST TO BREZHNEV'S; THEY ARE THE ONLY LEADERS TO CALL FOR "RESTRAINT," ALTHOUGH KIRILENKO AND PELSHE HAVE ADVOCATED "PATIENCE." PODGORNYY, KOSYGIN, AND ANDROPOV WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE MOST DOVISH BY THIS MEASURE. KIRILENKO STANDS SOMEWHAT TO THE RIGHT OF CENTER, AND

GROMYKO AND SHELEPIN APPEAR THE MOST HAWKISH. IT SEEMS NOTEWORTHY THAT GROMYKO ALONE CALLED FOR "REBUFF" TWICE IN 1974 (SEE SECTION 4).

28. SHELEPIN'S STANCE AS THE (FORMER) POLITBURO MEMBER MOST UNCOMPROMISINGLY AND UNIFORMLY CRITICAL OF THE CHINESE LEADERS APPEARS CONFIRMED BY SEVERAL FACTORS. MOST INDICATIVE WOULD SEEM TO BE HIS CALL IN 1970 FOR A "PROPER REBUFF" TO THE CHINESE AND IN 1973 FOR A "DECISIVE REBUFF," NOWHERE RELIEVED BY MORE CONCILIATORY LANGUAGE. IN HIS JUNE 1974 ELECTION SPEECH, SHELEPIN AGAIN PLACED HIMSELF APART FROM THE OTHER LEADERS BY LINKING CHINESE "AGGRESSIVE POLICY" WITH A SHARP CALL FOR VIGILANCE AND STRENGTH:

29. "COMRADES, LENIN'S SLOGAN OF TRIPLE VIGILANCE AND TIRELESS CARE FOR STRENGTHENING THE ECONOMIC AND DEFENSE MIGHT OF THE COUNTRY, OF OUR GLORIOUS AND HEROIC ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR, REMAINS IN FORCE...."

#### CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBERS AND SECRETARIES

30. SEVERAL LESSER SOVIET LEADERS HAVE ALSO COMMENTED ON CHINA RELATIONS IN THEIR PUBLIC UTTERANCES. WHILE PERHAPS LESS INDICATIVE OF POLICY CONSENSUS, THEIR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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PAGE 10 STATE 165128

POSITIONS ARE OF INTEREST. POLITBURO SECRETARY AND POLITBURO CANDIDATE MEMBER PONOMAREV'S VIEWS, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, APPEAR TO BE CLOSE TO THOSE OF SUSLOV. FOR EXAMPLE, PONOMAREV HAS CALLED FOR STRENGTHENING SOVIET DEFENSE POTENTIAL AND HAS ACCUSED THE CHINESE OF MAINTAINING TENSION ON THE BORDER AND OF "EXTENSIVE MILITARY PREPARATIONS"; HE HAS NEVER ADVOCATED "NORMALIZATION." FURTHER, LIKE GRECHKO AND SHELEPIN, PONOMAREV HAS SPECIFICALLY PLACED HIS SUPPORT FOR A STRONG DEFENSE IN THE CONTEXT OF CHINESE HOSTILITY.

31. CANDIDATE MEMBER DEMICHEV'S VIEWS SIMILARLY SEEM CLOSE TO THOSE OF SUSLOV. CANDIDATE MEMBER USTINOV'S POSITION, NOT SURPRISINGLY, RESEMBLES GRECHKO'S EXCEPT THAT USTINOV HAS ADVOCATED NORMALIZATION, ALTHOUGH HEDGING IN A WAY SIMILAR TO THAT OF SUSLOV AND PODGORNYY. SECRE-



TARY KATUSHEV HAS SUPPORTED NORMALIZATION.

ANNEX:

1. CALLING THE CHINESE NAMES:

PREDOMINANTLY CONCILIATORY:	PREDOMINANTLY CRITICAL:	CONSISTENTLY CRITICAL:
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BREZHNEV	PODGORNY	SUSLOV
KOSYGIN	GRECHKO	
KIRILENKO	MAZUROV	
ANDROPOV	PELSHE	
GRISHIN	SHELEPIN	
GROMYKO	SHCHERBITSKIY	

(KULAKOV, KUNAYEV, AND POLANSKIY ARE UNRECORDED.)

2. ASSESSING THE CHINESE TIE TO IMPERIALISM:

TEAMED UP WITH REACTION:	ALIGNED CONVERGING:	(ACCOMPLICE):
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BREZHNEV	KOSYGIN	SUSLOV
	PODGORNY	SHELEPIN
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PAGE 11 STATE 165128

KIRILENKO	MAZUROV
ANDROPOV	GROMYKO
GRECHKO	
PELSHE	
SHCHERBITSKIY	

(GRISHIN, KULAKOV, KUNAYEV, AND POLYANSKIY ARE UNRECORDED.)

3. ON NORMALIZING RELATIONS:

ACTIVE ADVOCACY:	PASSIVE ADVOCACY:	OF THEME:
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BREZHNEV	PODGORNY	GRECHKO
KOSYGIN	SUSLOV	SHELEPIN
KIRILENKO	GROMYKO	
ANDROPOV	PELSHE	
GRISHIN		
MAZUROV		

(KULAKOV, KUNAYEV, POLANSKIY, AND SHCHERBITSKIY ARE UNRECORDED.)

4. REACTING TO THE CHINESE:

RESTRAINT "REJECT" "STRUGGLE": STRENGTH "REBUFF":  
PATIENCE: "DENY": VIGILANCE:

KOSYGIN PODGORNYY BREZHNEV SUSLOV GROMYKO  
ANDROPOV GRISHIN KIRILENKO SHELEPIN  
MAZUROV GRECHKO  
PELSHE

(KULAKOV, KUNAYEV, POLYANSKIY, AND SHCHERBITSKIY ARE  
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